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Abstract 
The fast pace of advancement of the electronic communications post war has 
transformed many traditional aspects of social and technological life from the 
ubiquitous access to global information to personal mobile contact with friends 
and family. In the commercial sector, the electronic commerce or electronic 
business encompass any form of commercial transaction using Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI), Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) or other technologies to 
facilitate such exchange. Having its roots in late seventies, and spurred by a host 
of emerging technologies since its introduction, e-commerce faces a myriad of 
challenges and risks due to its pervasive nature. 
Major developments in personal (credit cards, ATMs) and business (ERP) 
transactions during late seventies through to nineties have fuelled the rapid 
growth of the electronic business culminating in the current explosion of the 
world wide web based transactions. However, in view of their impersonal and 
pervasive nature, electronic transactions are generally susceptible to fraud and 
improper use. 
The management of Risks is regarded as a key element of good business 
approach and governance. Whilst many aspects of business activities entail 
degree of risk often left to the discretion of the enterprise, the safety, 
environmental and governance issues are increasingly scrutinized and regulated. 
This lecture introduces a generic risk based framework founded on a 
number of systematic and systemic principles & a review of best practice in 
systems safety, security and sustainability. A candidate framework comprising 
assessment and management dimensions each founded on 7 key principles is 
synthesised and proposed for adoption across all e-commerce applications from 
business to business (B2B) to business to consumer (B2C). The framework 
offers a strategic yet coherent and scalable approach to risk assessment and 
management which can be mapped to the specific requirements of an 
organization or industry sector as appropriate.  
The framework as a strategic paradigm encompasses many matters of 
concern to the current and future of e-Commerce including security, trust, 
commercial and reputational risks, governance transparency and statutory 
compliance. It provides a robust systems foundation for a holistic and 
comprehensive incorporation of policies, tools and practices for decision 
support, monitoring of performance, detecting trends and timely detection of 
mishaps and activation of remedial actions and loss control plans. 
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Introduction 
A systematic regime for management of risks across many diverse disciplines by 
necessity requires a principled approach since the application would differ in each 
sector/industry, depending on the specifics of the technology, environment and resources 
employed. 
This chapter is aimed at developing a generic risk based framework founded on a number 
of systematic and systemic principles founded on a review of best practice. A candidate 
framework comprising assessment and management dimensions each founded on seven key 
principles is synthesised and proposed for adoption across all e-commerce applications 
from business to business (B2B) to business to consumer (B2C). The framework offers a 
strategic yet consistent and scaleable approach to risk management which can be mapped to 
the specific requirements of an organization or industry sector as appropriate. However, 




The rapid development of technology generates new products, systems, services and 
process knowledge often with significant potential to improve technical, commercial and 
environmental performance and enhance the overall quality of life. However, the new 
innovations especially those with embedded intelligence and adaptability are plagued by 
uncertainty about their overall characteristics including the concern about the risks arising 
from their adoption. To this end, a systemic assurance process and associated 
methodologies are required to underpin verification, validation and enhanced confidence in 
the desired performance of industrial & technological systems and innovations.  
The regulatory regime is the key instrument in the overall certification and deployment 
of new innovations in products and services. Many developments including the safety case 
regime mandated within nuclear, offshore and rail transportation in the UK are intended to 
pave the way to enhanced confidence as well as rapid deployment of modern innovations. 
In this context a systematic and principled approach to identification, control and 
management of risks is fundamental to the achievement, maintenance and improvement of 
the overall confidence and performance of products, processes, services, systems and 
undertakings. 
Electronic commerce as a modern service involves the exchange of data to facilitate the 
financing and payment aspects of the business transactions and encompasses a broad 
spectrum of activities ranging from consumer purchasing and banking via the world wide 
web to the institutional international business. Whatever the application, the integrity of the 
data exchange as well as the potential for fraud and abuse necessitate adoption of potent 
security and risk control strategies and solutions.  
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Products, processes and systems exhibit a number of facets in their performance which 
are either inherent or perceived by the relevant stakeholders. These generally comprise; 
a. Technical/operational 
b. commercial 
c. safety & security 
d. environmental & sustainability 
e. reliability, availability & maintainability 
f. quality 
g. perceived value 
Amongst these often inter-related aspects of performance only safety and 
environmental dimensions of products, processes, services and systems are currently 
subject to regulation. Understanding the key factors influencing the overall safety and 
security performance of various services, industrial and infrastructure systems will lead to 
the development of policy initiatives to promote safer, more secure and cost-effective 
solutions at the enterprise and industry level. It will also simplify regulation while 
providing transfer of knowledge and expertise from more successful domains and states to 
those which have evolved at a slower pace. 
 
RISK & ASSURANCE 
Derivation of Principles 
A principle is regarded as a fundamental truth or proposition on which many other 
propositions depend. It is also regarded as a fundamental assumption forming the basis of a 
chain of reasoning. It is argued that a management regime founded on a suite of principles 
will be superior in terms of its stability, integrity, effectiveness and its capacity to be 
adaptable and scaleable for multiplicity of circumstances and stakeholders since it is 
constructed using a set of fundamental & universal truths. A framework for management of 
risks should inherently address all life-cycle phases and issues comprising; 
• Identification/recognition of fundamental threats, faults and failures (causes of 
hazards),  
• Prediction of realisation/occurrence of hazardous states arising from threats, faults 
and failures,  
• Assessment of potential escalation of hazardous states into accidents/loss scenarios 
&  
• Coverage of post accident scenarios, actions and recovery processes  
• Human organisation, capabilities, resourcing, procedures and competencies 
• An inherent monitoring, measurement and enhancement regime 
On the other hand, assurance is synonymous with gaining increasing confidence about 
the performance of an often complex product, service, process or system so that; 
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• It delivers an optimal level of essential and desirable properties/performance 
• It is free form an unacceptable level of undesirable properties/performance 
A systems framework based on a complete and inter-related set of principles for 
performance assurance would enhance the degree of confidence that apart from the delivery 
of required functionality, the product, service, process or system is free from potentially 
harmful properties and behaviours hence assurance.  
A key aspect of the current approaches to understanding and managing desirable and 
undesirable properties is the disjointed and unsystematic treatment of the issues in these 
domains. Apart from lack of joined up approach in even one of these domains, most experts 
operating in one domain operate independently often unaware of the issues, processes and 
solutions in the other.  
It is argued that a comprehensive scrutiny, objective evaluation, assessment, 
understanding and management paradigm encompassing a systems world view would result 
in enhanced assurance and surety, in the face of complexity, uncertainty and change, a 
characteristic reminiscent of the rapidly evolving e-commerce domain. 
 
The Systems Approach 
We propose two complementary and advanced sets of systemic principles and 
processes as the underpinning backbone to tackling the challenges of safety, security and 
sustainability in all products, processes, services, systems and undertakings. Taking a life-
cycle perspective, these comprise items I & III below; 
I. Assessment: This comprises proactively recognising the need, defining the system, 
specifying and identifying/understanding of key properties, behaviours, hazards and 
vulnerabilities, evaluating and assessing expected impact;  
II. Realisation: This is ultimately aimed at developing the product, process, system, 
mission or undertaking whilst incorporating the desirable properties and avoiding the 
undesirable behaviours thus achieving the optimal performance; 
III. Management: this comprises taking the outcome of assessment and realisation into 
consideration and ensuring deployment, delivery of requisite performance, continued 
monitoring and control through a responsive and holistic suite of strategies and actions. 
Whilst Realisation is specific to a given domain, context and technology, the 
Assessment and Management aspects as a suite of principles constitute a meta-knowledge 
framework which can be abstracted and developed for almost universal application across 
many domains and disciplines. The systemic framework of assessment and management is 
equally applicable and effective within the context of desirable as well as undesirable 
properties of products, services and systems. This is contrary to the current conventional 
wisdom where specification, delivery and continual monitoring of desirable aspects of 
performance is regarded as an essentially domain expertise whereas the undesirable and 
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unintended emergent properties (hazards and vulnerabilities) are the forte of so called risk 
management. The +Safe3 extension to the renowned CMMi model also distinguishes 
between Safety Engineering & Safety Management, which are mainly synonymous with 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management advocated here.  
Whilst presented as a dual and complementary suite of principles and processes, 
assessment and management are iterative and systemic in the sense that processes inherent 
in the management framework employ assessment activities at requisite points to support 
judicious decision making and ensuring optimal performance. These are collectively 
referred to as Systems Assurance and labelled as Surety Framework in this paper. 
 
Risk Assessment 
This key facet of Surety framework depicted in figure 1 is proposed as a backbone to 
the identification, specification, evaluation and assessment of the undesirable events or 
properties adversely affecting technical functionality, cost, reliability, safety, quality etc. 
The risk assessment process comprises seven systemic aspects such as:  
(a) Hazard Identification;  
(b) Causal Analysis;  
(c) Consequence Analysis;  
(d) Loss Analysis;  
(e) Options Analysis;  
(f) Impact Analysis;  
(g) Demonstration of Compliance. 
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Figure 1: The Systematic Framework for Risk Assessment, its Interfaces and Interactions 
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The principles of risk assessment are general and equally applicable to the qualitative 
as well as the quantitative approaches to this discipline. They constitute a systematic 
framework within which, a broad spectrum of situations hazardous to health, safety and 
security of people and detriments to the environment or an enterprise may be identified, 
analysed and assessed. 
The qualitative risk assessment process broadly relies on expert judgement and 
empirical experience sometimes within a subjective and coarse quantitative process. It is 
worth noting that mere use of quantification and numbers does not necessarily qualify an 
assessment as quantitative.  These are however mainly a reflection of judgement and lack 
the objectivity and accuracy to generate a detailed and reliable measure of risks. 
The Risk Assessment process highlighted above satisfies the following requirements; 
• Potential for use of modelling; 
• Predominate application of objective and validated data; 
• Treatment of uncertainty associated with input data and results; 
• Treatment of dependency between significant factors; 
• Use of statistical simulation where appropriate. 
 
Modelling predominately represents a simplification and generalisation of reality but, 
enhances our understanding of causal relationships, highlights important factors and 
provides a useful tool for anticipation and potentially prediction of future. 
 
Advantages 
The quantitative framework for assessment of risks arising from hazards of 
undertakings, services, products and processes, yields a number of major advantages over 
its qualitative counterpart; 
• generates a quantified measure of risks in complex situations; 
• capable of addressing uncertainty and statistical variations in input data; 
• capable of addressing dependencies in the input parameters/data; 
• capable of generating confidence intervals for the quantified risks; 
• capable of demonstrating compliance with ALARP and other Industry Benchmarks; 
• auditable objective process with scope for review and improvement; 
• does not employ arbitrary tolerability criteria popularised by risk matrices; 
• does not require customisation or a specific form of a ranking matrix; 
• provides an auditable and traceable approach to decision support; 
• employs the same framework and principles as in the qualitative approach. 
 
Disadvantages 
The constraints and dis-benefits of the quantitative approach must be borne in mind 
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however, namely; 
• complex hence unsuitable for low risk systems and undertakings; 
• requires expert resource in knowledge elicitation and risk modelling; 
• need for extensive range of objective data and the requisite pre-processing; 
• need for formidable computing resource and know-how; 
• resource intensive, costly hence inappropriate for applications where a qualitative 
approach may suffice; 
• lack of readily available, robust and comprehensive computer based tools. 
The quantitative approach to assessment, recording and management of risks strives to 
generate a systematic framework for decision making and demonstration of legal and 
professional duty of care. In contrast with the qualitative approach and in compliance with 
the spirit of the Safety Case Regulations, the approach and methodologies of the 
quantitative process are more stringent and thus germane to the nature of significant risks.  
The systems framework comprising seven key principles highlighted above is equally 
applicable to qualitative and quantitative approaches to the assessment of risks arising from 
products, processes, services, undertakings and systems. The guidance for the required 
processing at each one of the seven stages of the systematic risk assessment framework is 
given below, commensurate with the requirements of the quantified process.  
 
Hazard Identification     
Circumstances with a potential to lead to loss, i.e. harm to people, financial detriment 
or environmental damage are associated with most activities and undertakings. Whilst it is 
relatively straightforward to identify these within the context of familiar day-to-day tasks 
and experiences, more complex products, processes, services and undertakings generally 
pose a more arduous if not insurmountable challenge in this respect.  Rapid development 
and widespread exploitation of cost saving or performance enhancing technologies 
generally exacerbate the situation and increase the scope for larger potential losses in the 
event of unforeseen or unprotected errors and failures. 
The structured comprehensive identification of hazardous circumstances arising 
from threats or unintended failure of products, services, systems, processes or 
human error/action is fundamental to any safety and security process. It is however 
even more pertinent to large scale or complex undertakings with a potential to lead 
to significant losses in the event of hazardous occurrences. In the absence of a 
systematic and robust hazard identification phase, all the subsequent safety analysis 
processes amount to no more than an exercise in vain, creating an illusion of 
safety/security and a false sense of confidence and comfort. This is particularly 
pertinent to circumstances where, due to a poor process, a number of significant 
hazards remain un-identified hence dormant within the system posing intrinsic 
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vulnerabilities. 
The determination of the domain of influence of a product, process, service or 
undertaking is another by-product of the systematic hazard identification process. 
This is essential in establishing the scope of the subsequent assessment and should 
be employed in preference to the traditional approach based on the physical 
boundaries of the subject under consideration. The radiation of electro-magnetic 
interference typifies instances where the domain of influence extends well beyond 
the physical boundaries of a poorly designed and constructed system. 
The systematic identification of hazardous circumstances entails two key stages at the 
outset; 
• Empirical Phase; 
• Creative Phase. 
In view of the extensive resource requirements, the approach described here is more 
appropriate to products, services, processes and undertakings which are likely to lead to 
significant losses due to their scope, scale or novelty. 
 
Empirical Phase 
Traditionally, the knowledge and experience of the past, in the form of Check-lists have 
been applied to the determination of the potential hazardous circumstances in new products, 
processes and undertakings. This approach is seldom adequate in isolation especially, when 
there are novelties or significant changes in the functionality, technology, composition, 
environment (time / space) or the mode of exploitation of the matter under consideration.  It 
is essential therefore to compile and maintain a Check-list of hazardous circumstances 
pertinent to specific products, processes or undertakings, in order to facilitate a simple first 
cut identification of the likely problem spots and where possible, avoid the errors, failures 
and losses of the past. 
Where the product, process or undertaking lend themselves to a more detailed scrutiny, 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for equipment / systems and its human related 
counterparts, Action Error Analysis and Task Analysis may be applied in order to identify 
the particular component failures or errors conducive to hazardous circumstances. These 
however require a detailed knowledge of the failure modes of the components and sub-
systems, including human actions and the likely errors.  
The application of Check-lists, FMEA, Action Error Analysis and Task Analysis are 
generally not resource intensive and may be carried out by suitably competent individuals 
and appropriately recorded for further analysis. The hazards identified through the 
application of these techniques generally constitute a sub-set of the total Potential Hazard 
Space which should be further explored with the aid of the complementary Creative 
techniques. 
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Creative Phase      
The systematic and creative techniques have an established pedigree in the analysis and 
resolution of complex problems. These generally capitalise on cognitive diversity through a 
team based approach, comprising members with diverse and complementary knowledge 
and backgrounds. Furthermore, in view of their reliance on lateral perception, divergent 
thinking and imaginative creative faculties, the structured and systematic variants of these 
techniques generally share a numbers of key characteristics namely: 
• planning and process management; 
• study panel (team) selection and briefing; 
• hierarchical decomposition and graphical representation of the problem domain;  
• high level probing of the key elements of the system and coarse determination of the 
critical sub-systems and interfaces; 
• comprehensive, step-by-step probing of the sub-systems and interfaces with a more 
meticulous scrutiny of the critical areas; 
• identification and recording of the hazardous circumstances including causes, 
consequences and potential mitigation and control measures; 
• expert driven ranking of the identified hazards employing an appropriate 
frequency/consequence matrix; 
• maintenance, update and management of the records throughout the life of the 
product, process or undertaking. 
The hazards identified through the empirical processes must be reviewed at appropriate 
stage(s) during the creative phase and recorded together with the other attributes alongside 
the newly identified items in a log.  The empirical phase is sometimes employed as a 
completeness test or means of detailed probing of specific hazards and failures, subsequent 
to the creative identification phase. Whichever the temporal order, the empirical and 
creative phases must be applied in a consistent and complementary manner to re-enforce 
and increase confidence in the hazard portfolio. 
The two-phase process enhances the integrity and coverage of the potential hazard 
space, increasing the effectiveness and confidence in the safety and security process. It has 
to borne in mind that the hazard identification exhibits an essentially non-linear gain and a 
creative identification of a single significant hazard may outweigh the contribution of a 
large number of less severe items. In this spirit, it is the quality and not the quantity of the 
identified hazards which is of the essence. The methodologies which generate an 
unrealistically large number of mostly trivial hazards are wasteful of resource, misleading 
and unproductive and should be avoided wherever possible. Furthermore, the subsequent 
analytical treatment of hazards as detailed in this chapter should be applied on a prioritised 
basis, beginning with the highest ranking hazards. 
  
International Journal of Information Science and Management, Special Issue               Sep. – Oct., 2010 
A Systems Framework for Strategic Approach to Risk in E-Business 98 
Causal Analysis      
Upon systematic identification and ranking of hazards arising from a product, process, 
service, system or an undertaking, it is often constructive and sometimes necessary to 
further explore the logical relationship between the basic errors and failures which could 
potentially realise the hazards. The aim is to address each hazard at the root cause level 
with a view to preferably eliminate and where not feasible, reduce the frequency or 
likelihood of its realisation (occurrence).  
 
Process       
The causal analysis is a mainly empirical process requiring domain knowledge of the 
product, process, service or undertaking. The techniques of Causal Analysis are generally 
applied recursively in a top-down mode to a given general state (hazard or threat) until all 
low level specific causes, errors and failures are arrived at. This deductive approach 
generally produces a number of intermediate states, each potentially caused by lower level 
causative factors. The general heuristic is to continue with the decomposition of each 
intermediate state until all fundamental causal factors such as basic component failures, 
unintended human errors or malicious acts are arrived at or it proves impracticable to 
acquire reliable data pertaining to lower level factors. The causal analysis techniques are 
predominately applied within reliability engineering and are generally supported by 
mathematical foundations and a suite of computer based tools. 
 
Modelling       
The causal analysis techniques generally employ graphical modelling which constitute 
a potent form for the capture and communication of the inter-relationship of the primary 
errors and failures leading to a hazard or vulnerability. Whilst predominately employed 
qualitatively, the causal models often lend themselves to quantification which ultimately 
generates a probability or frequency for the hazard or threat under analysis. The key issues 
to bear in mind during the causal modelling process are: 
• correct logical relationships; 
• decomposition commensurate with data availability; 
• common cause failures; 
• redundancy; 
• inter-dependency of some errors and failures. 
 
It is also important to ensure that different variables expressed in probabilities or 
frequencies are combined appropriately to generate consistent results for example, ensure 
that two frequencies are not multiplied to yield units in terms of per time squared! 
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Quantification      
The quantification of causal models entails an objective assessment of the potential 
frequency or likelihood for the causal factors. These are combined according to the rules of 
probability calculus and Boolean logic to generate a normalised or absolute measure for the 
realisation of the hazard or threat often referred to as the top-event in view of the top-down 
nature of causal modelling. The key issues to bear in mind during the provision and 
statistical processing of data for the quantification of causal models are: 
• reliable and objective sources for the basic errors and failures; 
• consistent application of compatible data types; 
• appropriate pre-processing of the data e.g. mean over a number of years; 
• uncertainty and non-linearity in the data; 
• sensitivity and importance criteria for the errors and failures. 
 
Where input data is specified with confidence intervals or a significant sample size is 
available, the use of statistical simulation techniques is essential in generating a probability 
or frequency forecast for the hazard or threat.  
 
Constraints       
The causal modelling techniques are generally incapable of addressing temporal 
variations in data and only apply if frequencies and probabilistic errors and failures remain 
constant over time.  Furthermore, causal models are often generated by individual domain 
experts and it is essential to subject these to peer review in order to enhance confidence in 
their integrity and correctness.  
 
Consequence Analysis     
Whilst the causal analysis is aimed at establishing the factors leading to the realisation 
of a hazard or threat, consequence analysis is concerned about what may potentially follow 
the occurrence of a hazardous situation. This is the least understood and exercised mode of 
analysis to the extent that most established criteria for safety and security in vogue in 
industry are only concerned with the occurrence of a hazard and implicitly assume each 
occurrence necessarily equates directly with an undesirable catastrophic accident or loss. 
The notions of Wrong Side and Right Side Failure and their application as criteria for safety 
performance are indicative of this misunderstood discipline. In truth, the occurrence of a 
hazard may potentially lead to a broad range of consequences, some of which may 
probabilistically be undesirable events. The correspondence between the hazard and a 
catastrophic consequence/accident is seldom at parity i.e. it rarely follows that the existence 
of a hazard or threat can be assumed to correlate 100 per cent with the worst likely 
accident.  
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The Process       
The consequence analysis is a largely probabilistic and potentially creative process 
requiring domain experience pertaining to the application of the product, process, system or 
undertaking. The techniques of Consequence Analysis are generally applied recursively in a 
bottom-up or forward inference mode to a given specific state (hazard or threat) until all 
potential general consequences (incidents and accidents) are arrived at. This inductive 
approach generally produces a number of intermediate states, each probabilistically leading 
to a number of other likely intermediate states or consequences. The heuristic in this mode 
is to continue with induction at each intermediate state until all known barriers to the 
escalation of the hazard or threat are exhausted and all potential incidents, accidents or safe 
states are identified. The consequence analysis techniques are predominately applied within 
decision theory. 
 
Modelling       
The consequence analysis techniques generally employ graphical modelling which 
constitute a potent form for the capture and communication of the incidents, accidents and 
other benign states potentially arising from the realisation of a hazard or threat. 
Consequence models often in the form of trees lend themselves to quantification which 
ultimately generates a probability or frequency for each predicted incident and accident. 
The key issues to bear in mind during this modelling process are: 
• clear understanding and definition of the hazardous or threat state to be analysed; 
• existence of physical barriers (protection systems) to the escalation scenario ; 
• existence of procedural barriers to the escalation scenario; 
• existence of circumstantial barriers to the escalation scenario; 
• the strength of each barrier’s capability in preventing further escalation; 
• the escalation path upon success or failure of the identified barriers; 
• uncertainty and non-linearities in barrier strength; 
• the inter-dependencies between various barriers to escalation scenario . 
 
Where barriers to escalation are non-existent, it is possible to identify the need for 
protective measures in the course of consequence analysis i.e. the need for a non-existent 
detection system or procedure. Furthermore, if a hazardous situation is experienced and 
knowledge of its rate or likelihood of occurrence is at hand, consequence analysis would 
prove more beneficial than its causal counterpart in establishing the likely consequences 
and extent of potential losses. This might obviate the need for causal analysis in some 
circumstances. 
It is prudent to explore the existence and effects of physical, procedural and 
circumstantial barriers to escalation scenarios associated with a hazard or threat in a 
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systematic and ordered manner to ensure all potential safeguards are identified and 
incorporated in the consequence model. 
 
Quantification      
The quantification of consequence models entails an objective assessment of the 
potential strength (likelihood for success) for all identified physical, procedural and 
circumstantial barriers. These are either based on historical data, result of specific causal 
analysis or expert judgement where no objective data can be traced. The key issues to bear 
in mind during the provision and processing of data for the quantification of consequence 
models are: 
• reliable and objective sources for the barrier strength (success probability); 
• appropriate pre-processing of barrier data; 
• uncertainty and non-linearity in the data ; 
• dependency of barriers; 
• sensitivity criteria for the barriers within a model. 
 
Where input data is specified with confidence intervals, the use of statistical simulation 




The consequence modelling techniques are generally incapable of addressing 
interdependency, spatial and temporal variations in data and only apply if identified barriers 
to the escalation scenario retain a constant strength over time.  Furthermore, in view of the 
probabilistic and creative nature, it is prudent to develop consequence models with the aid 
of a team comprising diverse domain experts as opposed to resorting to a single analyst. 
 
Loss Analysis       
Loss comprises various degrees of harm to people, commercial/operational detriment to 
an enterprise or contamination / damage to the ecology of the environment or a 
combination thereof. It is associated with most undesirable consequences arising from the 
hazards of products, processes, systems and undertakings. Loss analysis constitutes the 
final stage of intrinsic hazard evaluation prior to adoption of reduction and containment 
strategies. 
The statutory legal framework is mainly focused on prevention and regulation of harm 
to people and more recently, the environment. Commercial/operational losses on the other 
hand remain the prerogative of the business to avoid, transfer, mitigate, reduce or tolerate.  
In view of the diversity of needs and requirements, it is prudent to evaluate the losses 
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associated with undesirable consequences in three distinct categories and aggregate these at 
a later stage. Loss analysis comprises the systematic investigation of the adverse outcome 
associated with all incidents and accidents identified through consequence analysis. The 
key processes in the evaluation of loss comprise; 
• Safety Loss Estimation; 
• Commercial/operational Loss Estimation; 
• Environmental Loss Estimation. 
 
Since the totality of loss is of the essence in the decision making process, upon 
evaluation, these need to be converted into a common currency and aggregated. The scale, 
scope and treatment of loss is context sensitive and in view of the inherent complexity, 
these are often treated subjectively. 
  
Safety Loss Evaluation or Estimation     
The evaluation or estimation of measures of harm to people arising from undesirable 
consequences such as collisions, derailments, fires and a whole host of man-made and 
natural disasters is dependent on a large number of context sensitive factors. The 
significance, causal relationships and dependencies between these factors are not 
adequately understood and most industries currently resort to published historical data for 
the estimation of safety losses. This is often in the form of statistical Means over a number 
of years and is fraught with a number principal difficulties namely: 
• irrelevance of a historical mean to specific circumstances under study; 
• distortion of means caused by rare catastrophic incidents and accidents; 
• insufficient data regarding causal and contributory factors; 
• variability due to introduction of different generations of technologies and 
infrastructures; 
• secondary effects e.g. fires, derailments subsequent to a collision or exposure to 
harmful substances; 
• poorly understood relationship between circumstances and loss severity; 
• multiplicity of the types and classes of harm. 
 
It is prudent therefore to establish an objective process for safety loss estimation which 
is capable of generating forecasts for the specific circumstances under consideration. The 
current practice severely undermines the effort spent in causal and consequence analyses of 
significant hazards in the industry and reduces the accuracy of the overall assessment 
process. It is also incompatible with the systematic framework depicted in this chapter. In 
the interim however, historical Means have to be appropriately scaled and processed to take 
account of specific circumstances predicted by consequence analysis, in order to give a 
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semblance of reality and systematicity. 
Safety loss should be measured in Minor Injuries, Major Injuries, Fatalities and 
Equivalent Fatalities. This is a process through which, various degrees of estimated harm to 
a given group of people exposed to the consequences of a hazard, is aggregated into an 
equivalent fatality figure for decision making purposes. The current convention is to 
aggregate fatality, serious injury and minor injuries in 1 : 0.1 : 0.005 ratio respectively in 
order to generate an estimate for safety loss in Equivalent Fatalities. 
 
Commercial/Operational Loss Estimation    
In addition to the potential safety implications, most incidents and accidents entail a 
measure of loss to the enterprises involved in terms of: 
• disruptions to services causing delays; 
• damage to movable assets; 
• damage to infrastructure and equipment; 
• loss of goods and material; 
• loss of goodwill; 
• loss of stake-holder/consumer trust and decline in custom; 
• claims and potential legal fines; 
• premium increases and other consequential losses. 
 
An objective measure of these pertaining to the specific circumstances predicted by 
consequence analysis should be estimated, converted to a common currency (money) and 
aggregated to generate an overall figure for commercial/operational loss.  Also note that 
whilst it is difficult to delegate safety and environmental duty of care, in the short term, 
their consequent losses including those due to commercial and operational loss can be 
largely transferred through contractual agreements and insurance. 
 
Environmental Loss Estimation    
Apart from the commercial implications, release and dispersion of harmful substances 
in the environment as a result of incidents and accidents poses threats to health and safety 
as well as the ecology. These may typically involve any combination of: 
• fuels, oils, flammable substances; 
• liquefied gases, explosives; 
• caustic, corrosive and reactive chemicals; 
• minerals and reactive material; 
• radio-active materials; 
• bio-toxins. 
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In addition to the immediate effects, further damage may be caused through dispersion 
into the atmosphere and contamination of land, water tables and rivers. The specific 
circumstances should be identified through consequence analysis. The environmental loss 
estimation may potentially involve an evaluation of the costs associated with: 
• clean-up operations; 
• containment strategies; 
• emergency services; 
• fines by Environment Agency, Rivers Authority etc.; 
• Claims by other affected parties. 
 
Systematic causal and consequence analysis may also reveal the need for further 
barriers to scenario escalation including protection systems, damage containment policies 
and emergency preparedness measures. It is prudent therefore to develop an objective 
process for the estimation of likely effects of incidents and accidents on the environment 
and convert and aggregate these in a common currency (money) to generate an overall 
figure for the environmental loss. 
 
Loss Integration      
The three broad categories of Safety, Commercial and Environmental loss may be 
realised as a result of incidents and accidents pertaining to hazards associated with the 
products, processes, systems and undertakings. 
The evaluation of Health and Safety losses are required under the UK and most 
statutory frameworks in order to establish the tolerability and reduction of these to within 
reasonably practicable levels. Further to legal compliance, the knowledge of the extent and 
scope of the safety, commercial and environmental losses provides the objective data for 
prudent business decision making.  However, it is useful for all three components to be 
converted and expressed in a common currency such as money for potential comparison 
and aggregation in order to provide a coherent view of the totality of loss associated with a 
hazardous situation. This ensures that safety and environmental issues become integral to 
often largely commercially driven decision making, enabling a realistic and balanced 
perspective on risk management within the enterprise. 
The commercial and environmental losses or risks associated with each hazard are 
generally expressed in monetary terms. The safety loss or risk on the other hand is 
measured in terms of harm to people generally in the form of estimates or statistics 
pertaining to injuries and fatalities. A convention exists for normalising injuries and 
converting these to an Equivalent Fatalities (Lives). It is then possible to add injury forecast 
or statistics to fatality forecasts/statistics and produce a single estimate for safety risks in 
terms of Equivalent Lives. For aggregation with other mainly monetary losses, safety loss 
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forecasts can further be converted into their equivalent monetary value employing the 
concept of Value of Preventing a Fatality (VoPF). This mainly statistical concept is purely 
employed to support safety related decision making and should not be misinterpreted as 
putting monetary value of lives of individuals. It is customary to employ the product of 
equivalent fatalities estimated for a product, process, system or undertaking by the industry 
benchmark for VoPF to develop an objective measure of total safety losses as a basis for 
further safety investment and prevention of such losses. This is intended to transform safety 
based investment and decision making from a fundamentally moral imperative to a rational 
process that can be contrasted and enforced globally with the key variant being the VoPF 
for the given circumstances under consideration. The adoption of a systematic risk 
framework and setting of a global value for VoPF to underpin enforcement of safety 
considerations in major undertakings is an imperative for transparency, fairness and 
demonstration of duty of care as witnessed in the controversy surrounding the large scale 
North American oil exploration disasters. 
 
Options Analysis      
The hazard identification process reveals a portfolio of circumstances which are 
subsequently prioritised and analysed through causal, consequence and loss analyses. 
Depending on the consequent losses, the hazards may subsequently require risk elimination, 
mitigation, transfer, control or an appropriate combination thereof.  The identification, 
ranking, evaluation and management of viable pro-active hazard rate reduction (causal 
level) and largely re-active containment (consequence level) strategies constitute option 
analysis. 
The identification and ranking of options is carried out within a process analogous to 
that defined for the hazards although, causal and consequence analyses of a hazard also 
serve to characterise appropriate rate reduction and containment strategies.  
A number of options should generally be identified and recorded for each hazard or 
groups of synergistic hazards, taking into account established and emerging technologies. 
The options portfolio comprises those which precede the occurrence of a hazard (RO type) 
and those which are effective post hazardous event (CO type). The options which precede 
the hazard horizon are primarily aimed at elimination or rate reduction hence labelled as 
Reduction Options (RO). The RO type measures are generally aimed at the prevention or 
retardation of the causal factors and are usually evaluated with the aid of causal analysis 
tools. 
The options which are effective post occurrence of a hazard are mainly aimed at loss 
Containment (CO) and constitute further barriers to the escalation scenario. The CO type 
measures are usually identified or assessed with the aid of consequence analysis. 
Irrespective of the type mix, the options portfolio must be reviewed at reasonable intervals 
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in order to ensure compliance with the ALARP principle in the context of management of 
safety risks in the UK or other statutory criteria. 
A sensitivity parameter may be derived for the RO and CO type options through the 
causal and consequence models in order to ascertain the most effective measures for risk 
reduction and containment. 
For each option, the annualised or the Net Present Value of the associated costs over 
the effective life must be evaluated and assessed as appropriate and recorded for 
comparison against potential benefits derived during through impact analysis.  
 
Impact Analysis      
Upon identification and recording, it is essential to estimate the likely effects and 
potential benefits of each option on the consequent safety, commercial and environmental 
losses in order to establish the objective and systematic criteria for selection and 
implementation. This is a requirement of the statutory legal framework in the UK to ensure 
and demonstrate that the safety risks arising from a product, process, system or an 
undertaking are reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels. 
Impact analysis comprises a systematic analysis of the beneficial and any detrimental 
effects of implementation of an option with a view to eliminate, reduce, mitigate, transfer or 
control the risks rising from a given hazard. 
 
RO Type Impact      
The pro-active elimination or Reduction (RO) options are generally the preferred type 
and require treatment within the context of causal analysis. This generally involves 
incorporation of the option within the causal model or an assessment of its likely effect on 
the causal factors and appropriate adjustment of the rates or probabilities for each affected 
error or failure. The consequent safety, commercial and environmental Losses are 
subsequently re-evaluated through consequence and loss analysis. The Equivalent Lives 
differential thus evaluated pre and post implementation of an option should be recorded 
together with corresponding commercial and environmental loss differentials. These 
collectively constitute the Impact Parameters associated with the option and are employed 
in conjunction with the cost estimate in order to derive the safety and business criteria for 
the implementation of the option. 
 
CO Type Impact      
The mainly re-active Containment (CO) type options comprise detection and protection 
systems and procedural barriers to further escalation of a hazard. This class of options are 
generally effective in the post hazard horizon in that they will not affect the realisation of a 
hazardous state but assist with reducing the likelihood of a hazard transforming into 
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accidents or the consequent accidents causing as much loss. The CO type measures should 
be evaluated through the consequence model of a hazard with their probability of success 
judiciously set to reflect their potential effectiveness on demand. In view of the time and 
resource implications, the CO type options should preferably be incorporated into a 
consequence model during the knowledge elicitation and capture of consequence scenarios. 
In this case, their effectiveness should be defaulted to zero until impact analysis provides 
the necessary criteria for implementation or dismissal.  
In a similar process to that for RO type options, the evaluation of CO type measures 
entails the derivation of resultant safety, commercial and environmental Losses/risks 
subsequent to the adjustment of the effectiveness parameter. The Equivalent Lives 
differential evaluated pre and post implementation of the CO option should be recorded 
together with corresponding commercial and environmental loss differentials ideally 
computed in net present value terms if the effects are considered over a period of time. 
These Impact Parameters are employed in conjunction with the cost estimate arrived at 
during options analysis, ideally computed in net present value form, in order to derive the 
safety and business criteria for the implementation of the option. 
 
Demonstration of ALARP & Compliance   
The demonstration of compliance with the regulatory requirements and the ALARP 
principle in the UK necessitates an assessment of individual risks arising from the 
undertaking, product, process or system for the members of the affected groups 
(Employees, Customers and the General Public). Individual risk represents an average 
across a group and its assessment is contingent upon the knowledge of the totality of risk 
and the size of the exposed group within the population. It is also customary to consider the 
most at risk amongst the groups affected since the exposure patterns will differ even for the 
members of the same group. However such detailed differentiation is only justified when 
patterns of risk exposure in a given population or group are vastly different to the average 
and supporting data justifies such elaborate considerations. 
 
Demonstration of ALARP     
Within the context of UK regulatory legal framework, a duty is imposed on those who 
create a specific risk to health, safety and welfare of their employees, customers and the 
general public to ensure and demonstrate that these are reduced to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) levels. The criteria for tolerability of risks has been published by 
UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE), in terms of numerical targets for the individual 
risk of fatality for a specific group of people, exposed to the risks arising from a product, 
process, system or an undertaking.  The HSE criteria effectively define an upper 
quantitative limit for individual risk of fatality beyond which, risks should not be tolerated, 
International Journal of Information Science and Management, Special Issue               Sep. – Oct., 2010 
A Systems Framework for Strategic Approach to Risk in E-Business 108 
save in extraordinary circumstances. Risks falling below the upper limit of tolerability are 
expected to be subject to mitigation on a cost benefit basis, unless these are around two 
orders of magnitude smaller than the upper limit. It is important to note that the tolerability 
concepts apply at a holistic level i.e. to the totality of risks and not generally at the 
individual hazard level. 
 
The demonstration of compliance with the legal duty of care and ALARP principle 
entails the following stages: 
• identification of the hazards and the exposed groups potentially associated with the 
application of a product, process, system or an undertaking and treatment of the 
hazard portfolio under the qualitative and/or quantitative framework as appropriate 
with a view to assess the likely safety losses/risks associated with each hazard; 
• development of a total risk profile for the product, process or undertaking in safety 
terms (the  evaluation of the commercial/operational and environmental risk 
categories should also prove valuable); 
• identification of elimination, rate Reduction (RO) or Containment (CO) option(s) 
for each hazard; 
• determination of the net present value cost and impact of option(s) on the safety loss 
associated with the corresponding hazards; 
• determination of cost effectiveness for the identified options and derivation of Cost 
Safety Benefit (equivalent cost of saving a fatality through application) for each 
option; 
• Implementation of all options for which Cost Safety Benefit is smaller or equal to 
the Value of Preventing a Fatality (VoPF) or other industry criteria. The concept of 
gross disproportion should be applied to disparity between the Cost Safety Benefit 
of an option and the VoPF convention, depending on the magnitude of the total risk; 
• recording of the data, assumptions, calculations and consequent decisions. 
 
Whilst this process accords with the guidance given for the qualitative assessment of 
less significant risks, it is insufficient within the context of major risks which may violate 
the tolerability criteria. However, it ensures that all risk elimination, mitigation and control 
options are assessed and implemented, thus reducing the totality of risks to As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable level, but cannot determine tolerability against the published 
benchmarks. Furthermore, for new products, systems and processes, by focusing on 
individual hazards, the approach only ensures compliance with ALARP for the adopted 
design or approach. It would not guarantee the optimal low risk solution which might 
involve a different hazard portfolio. Optimisation of risks arising from products, processes, 
systems and undertakings is beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
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The determination of the tolerability of risks and the significance of gross disproportion 
as a criterion for the implementation or dismissal of the options requires a comparison of 
the totality of risks against apportioned industry benchmarks.  This is achieved through the 
complementary demonstration of compliance stage. 
 
Demonstration of Compliance    
Whilst the achievement and demonstration of lowest practicable levels of risk is 
broadly sufficient for the demonstration of legal duty of care, it is not suitable for 
determination of the tolerability, against industry performance benchmarks. Furthermore, in 
dealing with major risks within a quantitative framework, implementation of risk reduction 
and containment options cannot be carried out in isolation from the knowledge of the 
position of overall risk within the tolerability scale.  
The industry safety performance benchmarks in the UK are generally derived from the 
HSE guidance on industrial risks and criterion for tolerability. However, the benchmarks 
represent an annual average for the individual risk, influenced by a vast and diverse range 
of products, processes and undertakings. These benchmarks generally lie within the middle 
of the tolerability scale for each affected group, which is bounded by upper and lower 
numerical limits. 
The comparison of the aggregated risks of a product, process or an undertaking with the 
published benchmarks requires an assessment of the contribution of the particular item 
under consideration to the industry’s annual safety performance. This is known as 
apportionment, which in the absence of a systematic dynamic model for the whole of an 
industry, is an un-productive and unsystematic exercise. In the absence of such a model, a 
simple rational argument and calculation for apportionment is preferable to the often 
wasteful and expensive efforts in manipulating historical data.  
The demonstration of compliance with the industry safety principles and performance 
benchmarks entails the following stages: 
• A review and justification of all identified hazards and mitigation options against 
industry or regulatory safety principles; 
• aggregation of the safety loss of the hazards in the portfolio generating a total loss 
estimate for the product, process or the undertaking for each affected group; 
• estimation of the size of population exposed to the risks in each group; 
• calculation of the average risk per person in each group; 
• apportionment of the industry benchmarks to the specific contribution of the 
product, process or undertaking; 
• comparison and determination of tolerability against apportioned benchmarks; 
• if the risk is intolerable, i.e. it exceeds the upper level of tolerability, it shall be 
reduced to within tolerable levels or the product, process or the undertaking 
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abandoned, save in extraordinary circumstances; 
• if the risks are tolerable, follow a process as for demonstration of ALARP bearing 
the following in mind: 
- if the computed individual risk is close to the upper limit of tolerability, a gross 
disproportion between the Cost Safety Benefit and VoPF should be the criterion for 
implementation of RO and CO options.  
- if the computed individual risk is close to the lower limit of tolerability, the parity 
between the Cost Safety Benefit and VoPF should be the criterion for 
implementation of RO and CO options.  
 
In view of the current uncertainties and inaccuracies inherent in the apportionment 
process, the demonstration of compliance with the industry benchmarks should be treated 
as a coarse and relative indicator of safety performance of products, processes and 
undertakings. It is imprudent therefore to treat the individual risk calculations and the 
apportioned benchmarks as the sole dependable absolutes for decision making. 
 
Risk Management System – Principles 
Compliance with the requirements cited above requires a systematic scrutiny of defect-
failure-accident scenarios to ensure a comprehensive risk perspective. In reality, adopting a 
hazard and threat based approach to risk assessment and management generates a more 
systematic framework for coping with varieties of risks. A defect-error-failure sequence is 
proposed to address the processes leading to the realisation of a hazardous state or event in 
a product, process or system. Consideration of the post hazard horizon in this approach 
involves identifying the potential escalation scenarios, the defences against accidents, the 
range of accidents that arise due to the failure of defences and optimal response and 
recovery regimes for each major accident scenario. In a similar manner to the assessment 
regime,  the systematic framework for risk management comprises the following seven 
principles: 
(a) Prediction and Proactivity; 
(b) Prevention; 
(c) Containment & Protection; 
(d) Prepared ness & Response; 
(e) Recovery & Restoration; 
(f) Organisation & Learning; 
(g) Continual Enhancement. 
These principles collectively address the total risk landscape and are inter-related in a 
systemic fashion. They also relate to the framework for risk assessment in a consistent and 
demonstrable way. The principles are detailed below. 
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I - Prediction & Proactivity Principle 
The primary principle in systematic assurance is that of “prediction” which involves 
analysis and identification of credible system modes and potential loss/hazardous states, 
anticipation of escalation scenarios, evaluation and assessment of the baseline risks and 
taking hard and soft risk control measures in advance of foreseeable accidents. This by 
necessity involves developing and implementing methods and procedures to assess the risks 
and establish the baseline performance in order to support the case for further risk 
reduction, control or mitigation as appropriate. 
The principle is the focal point for the identification (prediction) of foreseeable 
activities, modes and states within a system which adversely affect performance (safety, 
operational, environmental, RAM etc.) comprising Normal, Degraded, Failure and 
Emergencies and the triggers and transitions for these.  
The administrative, strategic and implementation facets of performance are addressed 
through “proactivity” comprising policy, planning, resourcing and determination of strategy 
and plan for compliance with existing, emerging and modified directives, regulations, rules 
and mandatory standards. Proactivity also implies setting the ground rules and the scene for 
Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery policies (see other principles). 
Establishing communications channels between internal and external stakeholders 
including the production of a Safety Case for the organisation/undertaking, a Safety 
Management Manual, a Document Management System and a Configuration Management 
and Change Control System also fall within the scope of Proactivity. 
Within the context of e-commerce, this principle involves setting the ground rules and 
policies thus baselining the existing performance whilst clarifying benchmarks for the 
enterprise. 
 
II - Prevention Principle 
Once the baseline performance is established through “prediction” and the need for risk 
reduction is identified, the “prevention” strategy provides the most logical and prudent 
approach to the realisation of this objective. Prevention principle addresses the analysis of 
the known and new hazards/threats, understanding of their causation chain and 
identification of the measures capable of eliminating or reducing the likelihood of 
occurrence of the threats/hazardous states. 
Prevention strategies are best attempts at reducing defects, errors and failures and 
comprise a broad range of technical, procedural and human competence related measures. 
This is the cornerstone of most industries’ traditional approach to ensuring safe/secure 
states through design and implementation of fail safe systems, inspections, preventative 
maintenance, selection, training and briefing of staff. However, whilst prudent, these 
International Journal of Information Science and Management, Special Issue               Sep. – Oct., 2010 
A Systems Framework for Strategic Approach to Risk in E-Business 112 
measures fail to completely eliminate or control the threats/hazardous states thus assurance 
of desirable performance of the overall system cannot be relied upon the success of 
preventative strategies alone. 
The “prevention” focus ensures all causations and escalation routes to the 
threats/hazardous states are identified, analysed and all credible and reasonably practicable 
elimination and control measures are evaluated and implemented. This includes scheduled 
and preventive maintenance activities aimed at maintaining the functionality and integrity 
of the system. Within the context of e-commerce, this principle assists with establishing 
viable strategies for the elimination or reduction in the extent and scope of threats. 
 
III - Containment & Protection Principle 
The thrust of the classical approach to performance assurance of systems, services and 
operations is embodied in the designs, architectures, rules, processes, systems and 
behaviours which are mainly based on the Prevention philosophy as cited before. 
Whilst allocating resources and focusing attention on prevention is rational and 
prudent, it should not be at the expense of the mitigating risks, once undesirable hazardous 
events occur or threats are realised. The aim here is to determine the escalation 
mechanisms/scenarios for hazardous conditions and establish strategies, responsibilities and 
timely responsive action aimed at containing the energy or potential of hazardous 
states/threats in such a manner that they would not  escalate into accidents potentially 
causing commercial, environmental and human harm/loss.  
The preference here is to set up effective barriers to escalation and where possible, turn 
loss prone or hazardous occurrences into incidents or lower severity accidents. The second 
aspect to this is to attempt to “Protect” the people/property at risk against potential injuries, 
fatalities and collateral damage should accidents occur or attempt to reduce the severity of 
such harm/damage.  
The Containment and Protection Principle is developed and proposed in recognition of 
the fact that in spite of major efforts by duty holders, hazardous states do occur and threats 
do materialise in any system or environment often driven by complexity and change or 
adoption of unproven yet promising technologies. It is prudent therefore to have strategies, 
plans and measures in place to reduce the harm which would otherwise be caused by the 
escalation of these states if not controlled in a timely and effective manner. 
The Protection focus ensures that the escalation paths for credible loss prone/hazardous 
states are recognised and reasonably practicable measures (barriers) are identified, assessed 
and adopted/strengthened to detect and rectify the hazard/threat escalation and where not 
possible mitigate the consequences. 
Within the context of e-commerce, this principle focuses on the post threat horizon and 
assists with identification and implementation of strategies which can reduce the damage or 
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contain the threat within a much more constrained space thus lower the risks. 
 
IV - Preparedness & Response Principle 
The essence of risk management lies in the success of the Proactivity, Prevention and 
the Protection strategies and prudent risk control initiatives. However, in view of the 
complexities inherent in the many industrial, infrastructure and service sector operations, 
accidents do occur from time to time. In the same spirit, a high degree of anticipation and 
preparedness for responding to accidents, emergencies and degraded modes of operation is 
an integral facet of ensuring the impact is kept to a minimum. 
The preparedness is an aspect of organisational and resource planning and provision 
which entails anticipating, planning, resourcing, training and clarifying roles, 
responsibilities, communications, command structure and resources to address critical 
classes of degraded, failure and emergency states occurring within the operational 
environment. This by necessity requires a degree of learning from past experience as well 
as anticipating new scenarios when changes are enforced to the organisation, composition, 
structure or the operation of the systems being managed. 
The response dimension of the principle is mainly concerned with the implementation 
of the Preparedness plans comprising: 
• mobilising resources for presence on the scene and in support roles;  
• protecting the site;  
• evacuating the affected parties and the public;  
• determining a command structure to manage each event;  
• informing relevant civil authorities and emergency services with a view to protect 
and rescue those exposed or involved in the circumstances and minimise the degree of harm 
which would otherwise be sustained; 
• minimising overall harm and loss arising from an accident. 
 
The preparedness and response principle also addresses contingency scenarios i.e. 
new/unexpected degraded, failure and emergency aspects and circumstances for which, a 
general class of reaction is required as a safety net against all unforeseen cases. The 
preparedness and response focus ensures optimal reaction to accidents, catastrophes and 
security related losses is recognised and attained with a view to minimise safety and 
property losses in such circumstances. 
Within the context of e-commerce, this principle ensures key security related events 
entailing loss to the stakeholders are identified and appropriate classes of response are 
planned and implemented when circumstances dictate. 
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V- Recovery & Restoration Principle 
The timely and appropriate response to incidents and accidents ensure that people and 
collateral exposed to threats, hazardous states or accidents receive optimal help and support 
with a view to minimise any harm/damage which would otherwise be incurred in the 
circumstances. However, depending on the severity and nature of the degraded, failure or 
emergency state, a degree of anticipation, advance planning and resourcing is required to 
initiate timely and efficient recovery activities on the affected system or infrastructure.  
Recovery after incidents and accidents essentially begins after response process has 
resulted in securing the safety of the affected or exposed people and is mainly concerned 
with the processes and resources to repair the damage incurred in a safe, timely and 
efficient manner working towards the restoration of the system to normal state/service. It 
may also arise from disturbances to the system including preventive or reactive 
maintenance when the system is being brought back to normal operational state. Depending 
on the nature of the degraded, failure or emergency, the recovery activities may additionally 
impose various risk control restrictions on the functionality, infrastructure or the operation 
of the system. 
The restoration addresses the rules, processes, roles, tests, competencies and authorities 
required to ensure the state of the infrastructure or operations after the recovery activities 
are technically sound, efficient, affordable and acceptably safe for return to restricted or 
normal service. In this spirit, recovery and restoration are assurance related activities. 
Restoration may be achieved in a number of phases culminating in the full resumption of 
the normal operational state. 
The recovery and restoration focus ensures the repairs to the infrastructure and the 
service/production system post disturbances (including maintenance) and accidents is 
carried out in a safe and efficient manner and the subsequent deployment is subject to a 
systematic test, verification and validation process. 
Within the context of e-commerce, this principle ensures that in spite of the security 
threat or damage incurred, there are plans and means to optimally recover from such 
mishaps and restore a service to some form of normality and gradual enhancement. 
 
VI - Organisation & Learning Principle 
The achievement, maintenance and improvement of the overall performance of any 
system or operation is contingent on timely appropriate actions assured through a learned 
and competent human organisation. 
The Organisation Principle addresses the entire spectrum of human resource issues 
pertinent to the maintenance and improvement of performance. These include recruitment, 
induction, deployment, training, development briefing and communication of critical issues, 
qualifications, physical fitness, certification and regular verification and validation of the 
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capabilities and competence. 
Traditionally, assurance is treated as a specialist discipline and relegated to a particular 
group of staff solely concerned with this objective. However, whilst performance assurance 
like other disciplines has its specialist niches, its recognition, understanding of the 
underlying concepts, care for other people’s health, safety and welfare constitute a broad 
suite of beliefs, values and practices  referred to as organisational culture. The recognition, 
promotion and nurturing of this culture is a crucial factor in the success of policies and 
initiatives within an organisation. Assurance culture promotes the notion that apart from 
specialist activities, knowledge, practices, beliefs and values in accident prevention should 
be common to all who have a role in the provision of service or systems with a potential to 
cause harm to the customers, employees and the general public or damage to the 
environment and property.   
The organisation does not necessarily imply a dedicated arrangement for risk 
management, fundamentally separate from other functions of the business or service 
organisation, infrastructure management or other stakeholders. Apart from specialist 
activities, a supportive and pervasive assurance culture must be developed and promoted 
throughout the enterprise including education, briefing and establishment of a confidential 
channel for communication of observations, suggestions and feedback on all performance 
related matters. In this spirit, the principle underpins all other aspects of the framework 
since it provides the human motive force for realisation of all other principles inherent in 
assurance management. 
The other facet of the organisation principle is the ability to learn and capitalise on the 
new and emerging knowledge for improving performance. A key instrument supporting the 
learning process is development, implementation and maintenance of a corporate memory 
to underpin the recording, retrieval and processing of relevant knowledge and resultant 
learning. The corporate repository of performance information must include an up-to-date 
directory of infrastructure, systems and operational threats/hazards which needs to be 
initiated at system level whilst being updated for local conditions. This repository must be 
made accessible to all stakeholders to inform them about all pertinent issues which may 
relate to their roles, tasks and undertakings within the system. 
The repository of performance information should additionally include records of 
reported failures, threats, incidents and accidents and any analysis establishing causation, 
escalation mechanisms and the degree of harm or damage caused. It is crucial that these are 
captured, shared openly and employed actively to enhance systems and processes with a 
view to prevent future occurrences (prevention principle). This is a costly but essential 
aspect of learning from what in principle amounts to the failures of the Management 
System. 
Finally, the organisation principle must cater for the relationships, reporting structure, 
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licensing and responsibilities of various organisations involved in the design, installation, 
operation, maintenance and disposal of the infrastructure, service delivery, production 
system and its constituents. 
The focus on organisation and learning ensures that competent people are recruited, 
trained and tasked with assurance related activities and lessons are learnt from faults, 
failures, incidents and accidents with a view to eliminate or minimise future occurrences. 
Within the context of e-commerce, this principle delivers a human focused assurance 
dimension to ensure a constructive and sympathetic culture is present to support a 
competent work force. This balances the traditional technology focus that is in vogue 
within the e-commerce and e-business domains. 
 
VII- Continual Enhancement Principle 
The principles and their inherent activities cited earlier can underpin achieving and 
sustaining a desirable performance in the context of a product, process, service, system or 
undertaking. However, improving quality of life, advancing social values and consequent 
emerging legislation, rules and standards tend to demand more stringent targets, more 
responsive behaviours and improving overall performance. The other key driver is the 
rising consciousness in the society about duty of care and negligence by people and 
organisations delivering services and products and the consequent criminal and civil claims 
in the event of accidents causing harm to victims or financial loss to the stakeholders. 
The inherent complexities of the infrastructure, production systems and operations in 
industrial and service sectors as well as the increasing demand for incorporation of novel 
technologies pose a challenge to the maintenance of performance levels during the 
transition. A rational, systematic and scientific approach to the traditionally empirical 
treatment of assurance matters in the industry is called for. Identification of key 
performance indicators, measurement and proactive control of risks are key instruments in 
the new approach. 
The continual enhancement of various facets of performance necessitates an objective 
appreciation of the existing drivers, actors, faults, failures, hazards, threats, targets and 
existing performance levels before reasonably practicable options are identified, assessed 
and adopted for improvement. To this end, a comprehensive approach to identification, 
monitoring and measurement of precursors to accidents, agreement on relevant 
performance criteria and normalising factors, audit of safety and security processes and 
culture, review of targets and making a case for performance improvements constitute the 
essence of this principle. 
The enhancement of performance may arise from the introduction of novel 
feature/functionalities, identification and strengthening of the barriers to causation or 
escalation of the hazardous states or complete elimination of hazards through adoption of 
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new technologies. The extent and scope of the performance improvements may be driven 
by revised targets, new standards or emerging lower cost technologies making risk 
reduction reasonable when contrasted against the likely gains. 
The corporate repository of performance information cited under the organisation 
principle should also be actively reviewed for detecting trends in the underlying causes and 
breaches, precursors to accidents and near hits (strangely referred to as near misses). This 
information should be communicated with all stakeholders and employed as a potent tool to 
systematically eliminate the unacceptable levels of faults, failures and errors arising from 
human or automation sources, thus preventing accidents.  
The focus on continual enhancement ensures attainment of tolerable levels of overall 
performance is treated as a dynamic and evolving objective subject to a systematic and 
ongoing measurement and assessment regime to support credible understanding of the 
performance thus underpin the need and quest for sustaining good performance and 
enhancement. 
Within the context of e-commerce, this principle as a supervisory and feedback sub-
system ensures all the other six principles deliver value in effectiveness, meeting the 
desirable benchmarks and providing a systemic suite of controls and policies for continual 
performance assessment and timely response to shortcomings. 
 
Risk Management Framework 
The seven principles inherent in the performance assurance of products, processes, 
services, systems and organisations fall into three broad categories; 
The first principle, proactivity, is mainly concerned with establishing an environment 
and a baseline for the product, process, service, system or organisation in terms of its 
desirable properties and performance. It represents an antithesis to reactivity in facing the 
potential of accidents. In this spirit, proactivity is fundamental to the achievement and 
improvement of performance since it emphasises that plans and resources must be devised, 
secured and applied in advance of incidents, threats and accidents to enable the duty holders 
to eliminate, control or mitigate the risks. 
The second group comprising prevention, protection, response and recovery are mainly 
associated with causation and escalation of accidents and the optimal preparedness in 
responding to these and emergencies with a view to minimise losses. 
The third and final group of two principles relate to the significant role that the human 
organisation, communications, responsibilities, competencies, certification, regulation and 
corporate memory/learning play in the attainment and improvement of overall performance. 
This includes a drive for continual enhancement based on an audit, measurement and 
feedback loop to ensure a set of common indicators are continually monitored to empower 
the duty holders to take effective remedial and improvement actions as appropriate. 
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The seven fundamental principles collectively constitute a systematic and systemic 
framework for assurance of overall performance in the face of threats and risks. These are 
outlined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
The Systemic Assurance Framework of seven Principles 
Principle Scope & Intent 
I. Prediction & 
Proactivity 
Setting Policy and Strategy, identifying all stakeholders and interfaces, 
Hazard/Threat Identification, planning, resourcing and data collection. 
Modelling, assessing baseline risks, identifying key performance 
indicators and implementing policy. Developing Safety, Security & 
Sustainability Cases and relevant Management Manuals 
II. Prevention 
All measures, processes, activities and actions including maintenance 
aimed at eliminating or reducing the likelihood/frequency of 
threats/hazardous states with a potential to cause harm and loss 
III. Containment & 
Protection 
All measures, processes, activities and actions aimed at reducing the 
likelihood/frequency or severity of potential accidents arising from the 
hazardous states or security breaches 
IV. Preparedness & 
Response 
All plans, measures, processes, activities and resources relevant to 
managing degraded and failure modes and emergencies, investigation of 
the causes, collection, maintenance & sharing of records 
V. Recovery & 
Restoration 
All plans, measures, processes, activities and resources relevant to 
recovery from planned and unplanned disturbances, degraded and failure 
modes and emergencies towards full resumption of production/service 
including the criteria and organisation for authorising the system back into 
service post disruptions and emergencies 
VI. Organisation & 
Learning 
Structuring, communications, training, certification, competencies, roles 
& responsibilities and validation for human organisation as well as 
ensuring lessons are learnt from incidents and accidents and key points 
recorded, shared and implemented 
VII. Continual 
Enhancement 
All processes associated with setting and reviewing targets, measuring/ 
assessing, processing, auditing, reviewing, monitoring, regulating and 
sustaining/improving performance including decision aids and criteria 
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Figure 2 represents a constellation of complementary and inter-related principles which 
when applied collectively, can systematically underpin the attainment, maintenance 
(principles I-VI) and improvement (principle VII) of overall performance. A framework 
founded on systemic principles is more fundamentally credible, stable and universally 
applicable than specific context related suite of actions, processes or methodologies. 
 
Systemic Characteristics of the Management Framework  
Whilst holistic and complete, the proposed framework for risk management possesses 
essential properties such as simplicity, rationality and a level of abstraction which lends it 
adaptable to any context, scale and organisation. These are crucial to the stakeholders 
understanding, adapting and applying it to optimal effect.  
The framework transforms the traditional focus on accidents and loss to understanding, 
control and management of threats and hazards. This fundamental shift of emphasis yields a 
more profound knowledge on the root causes of faults, errors and failures thus resulting in a 
more effective management of business and operational risks. 
The framework sets out all the building blocks for systematic risk management starting 
with establishing the environment and baseline performance (principle I) leading to four 
focal points (principles II-V) for actualising plans and policy. A major emphasis is also 
placed on the organisational facets from performance focused structure, roles, 
responsibilities, accountabilities, competencies and communications to the more subtle 
cultural aspects (principle VI). Finally an active learning ethos and actualisation of learning 
in improvement of overall performance is emphasised in principles VI & VII. The 
intangible human dimension related to buy-in, motivation, participation, conflict resolution 
and taking people and property into account in everything we do is often ignored or not 
given sufficient prominence in existing management frameworks and standards. 
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The principles are not things to do per se. They constitute a complete strategic 
perspective and roadmap providing the essential focal points for the requisite activities and 
processes inherent in the systematic assurance of performance in products, processes, 
services, systems and undertakings. In this spirit, each principle also constitutes a focal 
point for measurement, benchmarking and determination of the status, success or 
shortcomings of the specific aspects of the Risk Management System.  
The principles within the framework are goal-oriented and apart from guidance on the 
purpose and nature of essential activities, are designed to allow specific stakeholders to 
adapt these to their roles and circumstances and innovate to improve performance. This is 
particularly relevant to the historically diverse nature of the international trade with 
different cultural and structural underpinnings to the participants and stakeholders.  
The four key focal points (principles II-V) on the actualisation of the plans and policies 
empower duty holders to collaboratively contribute to the overall performance of their 
operations. These principles would naturally involve a different set of activities for an each 
stakeholder organisation but none-the-less remain equally applicable at the framework level 
hence the need for scalability and adaptability. 
The proposed principles are valid at any stage of the life-cycle therefore, they are 
equally applicable to any group or organisation involved in the provision of service, 
products or management of infrastructure, production and operations. These can provide 
proactive indicators to assist the duty holders with their tasks as well as those responsible 
for the supervision and regulation of the relevant industry. 
It would therefore be feasible to audit, assess and score an organisation’s processes, 
capabilities and maturity in Proactivity, Prevention, Protection, Response, Recovery, 
Organisation and Continual Enhancement as appropriate to the nature of the undertaking. 
These scores and proactive criteria when benchmarked, will signify the status, strengths and 
shortcomings of an organisation in their systemic approach to the management of risks. 
Apart from audit, assessment and scoring of the individual principles, it is also possible 
to generate an overall index of merit for the performance of the whole framework, thus 
giving a holistic indication for the capabilities and maturity for an organisation in its risk 
management endeavours. This provides an objective and constructive framework for intra-
industry benchmarking, comparisons and enhancements. 
The proposed framework is founded on seven systemic principles which can underpin 
performance assurance when applied in aggregate. In this spirit, the architecture of the 
proposed framework is entirely scaleable and can be adopted to manage risks at the level of 
a product, process, team, project, department, organisation, an alliance of organisations and 
an industry as a whole or any larger aggregate of these constituent entities. At every level of 
the application, the essential invariant aspects of the framework i.e. the seven inter-related 
principles, require mapping and adaptation to the nature, scale, context, tasks and the 
application. 
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Figure 2: The Systematic Framework for Risk Management, its Interfaces and Interactions 
 
The Way Ahead 
Our systems approach to the holistic treatment of risks recognises the need for 
examination, understanding, characterisation and assessment of principal threats and 
hazards followed by a requisite suite of principles as a focal point for monitoring, 
supervision and management of resources to sustain performance. This has resulted in two 
systemic frameworks, one focused on identification, evaluation and assessment of risks and 
the other comprising seven principles on the performance assurance and management of 
risks. 
The seven principles underpinning the assessment of risks cited above constitute a 
comprehensive and disciplined framework capable of rendering a thorough understanding 
of the key threats, hazards and the magnitude of potential risks associated with these in a 
given context. However, these are not adequate to maintain effective control and assurance. 
The approach to the holistic management of risks is best served through a systemic 
framework comprising principles that hold true in different sectors, levels of hierarchy, 
contexts and circumstances. The principled approach generates consistency, integrity and a 
familiar harmonised process to underpin assurance activities. However, the principles in a 
framework only constitute focal points for allocation of resource and energy and require 
mapping to the specific characteristics and demands of an environment, sector, system or 
undertaking. 
A framework of seven principles developed and proposed for risk management address 
the risk management requirements comprehensively and holistically. The framework is 
equally applicable to security issues pertinent to the malicious intents and can provide one 
consistent and systemic environment for successful management of safety, security and 
potentially sustainability risks pertinent to products, processes, services, systems and 
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undertakings.  
Because of its principled constitution, the two frameworks are scalable and can be 
applied at any level and within any industrial, infrastructure and service sector context. The 
risk management framework has been adopted by the EU - Project "Safety and Reliability 
of Industrial Products, Systems and Structures" (SAFERELNET), described in 
www.mar.ist.utl.pt/SAFERELNET, funded by the European Commission under the 
"Competitive Sustainable Growth" programme.  
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